USA v. Spinner by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-1999 
USA v. Spinner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Spinner" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 154. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/154 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed June 16, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-7353 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM H. SPINNER, III, 
 
       Appellant 
 
APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(D.C. Criminal No. 97-cr-00143) 
(District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo) 
 
ARGUED MARCH 25, 1999 
 
BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, LEWIS, 
and WELLFORD,* Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed June 16, 1999) 
 
       PETER B. FOSTER (ARGUED) 
       Pinskey & Foster 
       121 South Street 
       Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Harry W. Wellford, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       DENNIS C. PFANNENSCHMIDT 
       THEODORE B. SMITH, III (ARGUED) 
       Office of United States Attorney 
       Federal Building 
       228 Walnut Street 
       P.O. Box 11754 
       Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant William H. Spinner, III, appeals the judgment 
of conviction of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania. Because the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction over the indictment, we will reverse 
Spinner's conviction and vacate this case to the District 
Court so that Spinner may be reindicted on Count I of the 
indictment and for further proceedings with respect to 
Count II. 
 
I. 
 
In Count I of an indictment filed on June 10, 1997, 
Spinner was charged with access device fraud in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 1029(1)(5). In Count II, Spinner was charged 
with bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344. Spinner 
appeared before the District Court on August 15, 1997, and 
entered a plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment. On 
June 4, 1998, the District Court sentenced Spinner to two 
years imprisonment. This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
"Happily, the rule that the indictment, to be sufficient, 
must contain all the elements of a crime . . . is still a vital 
part of our Federal criminal jurisprudence." United States v. 
Wander, 601 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting 
United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33, 37 (3d Cir. 
1965)). To confer federal jurisdiction in this case, the 
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interstate commerce element of the crime with which 
Spinner was charged must be alleged in the indictment. 
The United States, however, failed to allege the interstate 
commerce element of the crime in the indictment. It admits 
that "Count I of the indictment fails to allege that any of the 
transactions affected commerce." Appellant's Br. at 19. 
Nonetheless, it maintains that this is harmless error, 
because Count II of the indictment does allege the federal 
jurisdictional element. We disagree. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that a defendant has a 
"substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in 
an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of 
such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing 
more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless 
error." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960). 
The fact that the United States charged interference with 
interstate commerce in Count II of Spinner's indictment is 
not a sufficient basis on which to find federal jurisdiction: 
 
       The charge that interstate commerce is affected is 
       critical since the Federal Government's jurisdiction of 
       this crime rests only on that inference. It follows that 
       when only one particular kind of commerce is charged 
       to have been burdened a conviction must rest on that 
       charge and not another, even though it be assumed 
       that under an indictment drawn in general terms a 
       conviction might rest upon a showing that commerce of 
       one kind or another had been burdened. 
 
Id. at 218. Without alleging an effect on interstate 
commerce in the first count, then, the indictment in this 
case was jurisdictionally defective. 
 
When, as in this case, an indictment fails to allege all 
elements of an offense, the defect may be raised by the 
court sua sponte. We have held that "[f]ailure of an 
indictment sufficiently to state an offense is a fundamental 
defect . . . and it can be raised at any time." Wander, 601 
F.2d at 1259; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2); United States 
v. Beard, 414 F.2d 1014, 1015 (3d Cir. 1969) (quoting 
United States v. Manuszak, 234 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 
1956)). 
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Furthermore, notice alone cannot form a sufficient basis 
to validate a jurisdictionally defective indictment. In United 
States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "an effect on 
interstate commerce" was an essential element of a RICO 
offense without which an indictment was insufficient. It 
further held that notice alone was insufficient to validate 
the indictment: "The inclusion of all elements . . . derives 
from the Fifth Amendment, which requires that the grand 
jury have considered and found all elements to be present." 
Id. at 1230. 
 
Finally, Spinner did not waive this jurisdictional defect by 
entering a guilty plea. In United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 
975 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that "[a]lthough a guilty plea generally waives all claims of 
constitutional violation occurring before the plea, 
`jurisdictional' claims are an exception to this rule." Id. at 
977 (quoting United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 
(9th Cir. 1989), amended at 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990) 
("Claims that `the applicable statute is unconstitutional or 
that the indictment fails to state an offense' are 
jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea.")); see 
also United States v. Riviera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 
1989); O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 
1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1979). While a defendant's guilty plea 
may be thought to waive a jurisdictional defect, see United 
States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 39 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994), we are 
faced here not with a defendant who pleads guilty and then 
wishes to challenge the facts that give rise to federal 
jurisdiction (such as an effect on interstate commerce), but 
with an indictment that does not allege those facts. It is 
only in the former case that courts have found 
jurisdictional challenges waived by a guilty plea. See id. 
While a challenge to jurisdiction-defeating factual 
allegations requires a court to go beyond the fact of the 
indictment, no such difficulty arises here. See United States 
v. Caperell, 928 F.2d 975, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 
III. 
 
Since the United States failed to allege an essential 
element of the crime in the indictment, we have no choice 
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but to reverse and vacate Spinner's conviction so that he 
may be properly indicted and remand for further 
proceedings. 
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WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
It is for the judges of this circuit to decide whether 
defendant's guilty plea in this case constituted a waiver of 
the indictment deficiency discussed. This court indicated in 
a footnote, a few years ago, that a guilty plea may (not that 
it necessarily does) waive a jurisdictional defect: 
 
       [W]e need not reach the issuance of whether a guilty 
       plea waives jurisdictional as well as nonjurisdictional 
       defects. Compare United States ex rel. Shank v. 
       Pennsylvania, 461 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir. 1972) (asserting 
       that guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects), 
       cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1110, 93 S.Ct. 917, 34 L.Ed.2d 
       691 (1973), and United States ex rel. Jenkins v. 
       Hendricks, 45 F.2d 182, 183 (3d Cir. 1968) (same), 
       with United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 164 (9th 
       Cir. 1987) (asserting that guilty plea "establishes the 
       factual basis for jurisdiction") (cited in United States v. 
       Parker, 874 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 
United States v. Bentz, 21 F.3d 37, 39 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The Supreme Court has used broad language to indicate 
that a criminal defendant may forfeit (or waive) a 
constitutional right in a criminal case: 
 
        "No procedural principle is more familiar to this 
       Court than that a constitutional right," or a right of 
       any other sort, "may be forfeited in criminal as well as 
       civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the 
       right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine 
       it." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944). 
 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993). 
 
Another circuit has recently used broad language in 
considering this issue in the context of the jurisdiction of 
the court: 
 
        Martin's argument rests on the concept that a guilty 
       plea does not waive jurisdictional defenses to the crime 
       at issue. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 
       (7th Cir. 1994). But the nexus with interstate 
       commerce, which courts frequently call the 
       "jurisdictional element," is simply one of the essential 
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       elements of S 844(i). Although courts frequently call it 
       the "jurisdictional element" of the statute, it is 
       "jurisdictional" only in the shorthand sense that 
       without that nexus, there can be no federal crime 
       under the bombing statute. Kanar v. United States, 118 
       F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1997). It is not jurisdictional in 
       the sense that it affects a court's subject matter 
       jurisdiction, i.e., a court's constitutional or statutory 
       power to adjudicate a case, here authorized by 18 
       U.S.C. S 3231. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
       Env't, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 110, 140 
       L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). This court has recognized for 
       decades that, despite defendants' tendency to 
       "confuse[ ] facts essential to be alleged as elements of 
       the crime with jurisdictional requirements arising as a 
       matter of law," once a defendant plead guilty in"[a] 
       court which has jurisdiction of the subject matter and 
       of the defendant, as did the court in the instant case," 
       the court's judgment cannot be assailed on grounds 
       that the government has not met its burden of proving 
       "so-called jurisdictional facts." United States v. 
       Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 352-53 (7th Cir. 1959); La 
       Fever v. United States, 279 F.2d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 
       1960). Even if the government fails to establish the 
       connection to interstate commerce, the district court is 
       not deprived of jurisdiction to hear the case. See 
       generally Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1010-13. 
 
United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
 
Defendant Spinner entered into a guilty plea pursuant to 
a plea agreement in this case whereby he pleaded guilty to 
count one in exchange for dismissal of count two. There 
was, at sentencing, a full discussion of the nature of both 
charges, including the count two defrauding of"certain 
financial institutions by fraudulent use of access devices." 
The district court explained that "he must establish for the 
record your involvement in these charges." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Although I am inclined to believe that defendant may 
have waived his objection to the interstate aspect deficiency 
in count one, I am prepared to concur in the majority's 
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determination as to that count, but I also believe that 
matter may be remanded to the district court to consider 
whether defendant should be put to trial on count two (if he 
pleads not guilty), or whether defendant may choose to 
enter a guilty plea. The parties, represented by counsel, 
agreed that defendant was in fact guilty of the factual bases 
stated by the United States Attorney with respect to the 
charges. If, on technical grounds, we set aside the guilty 
plea to count one not based on any objection made by 
defendant to the district court, I believe the matter should 
in fact be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings as to count two. This court has sua sponte 
negated the plea agreement; defendant should be called 
upon to answer to the count two charges in fairness. I 
believe the defendant had real notice of the true nature of 
the charges made against him. 
 
I concur with the majority that Spinner may also be 
reindicted by means of a technically sufficient charge as to 
the factual basis of the count one charge. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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